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We investigate the impact of the 20 largest – in terms of insured losses – man-made or natural 
disasters on various insurance industry stock indices. We show via an event study that 
insurance sectors worldwide are quite resilient, in a market–value sense, to unexpected losses 
to capital: our data provide evidence that equity market investors believe that insurance 
companies will on average be able to make losses back over the foreseeable future, i.e. that 
the adverse shocks to equity which have resulted from these catastrophes will be compensated 
by either an outward shift of the demand curve or an ability to raise premiums, or both. 
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Large scale disasters, whether man-made such as the terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center in 2001, or natural such as hurricane Katrina or the recent tsunami 
catastrophe in the Indian Ocean, need not necessarily imply a disaster for the 
insurance industry. There is a well documented tendency (see e.g. Shelor et al. 
1992 or Cummins and Danzon 1997) for premiums to rise after such events which 
might or might not outweigh unexpected losses to capital, and a similar resilience 
to adverse effect is also reported for minor disaster such as denial of service 
attacks (Hovav and D'Arcy 2003). 
The mechanism which establishes a new market equilibrium subsequent to such 
catastrophes is discussed in detail elsewhere (see e.g. Gron 1994, Froot and 
O'Connel 1999, or Cummins and Lewis 2003) and shall not concern us here. 
Rather, we answer the empirical question whether disaster-related factors which 
raise premiums, such as an outward shift of the demand curve or a decrease in the 
supply of insurance induced by an increase in the cost of capital (Cummins and 
Danzon 1997), are able to overcompensate the adverse shock to equity, at least in 
the eyes of investors. To this extent, we examine the 20 most costly disasters (in 
terms of insured property and business interruption losses) in the 30-year period 
from 1974 to 2004
2, and determine via an event-study whether insurance-industry 
stocks as a group experienced any positive or negative abnormal returns 
thereafter. Positive abnormal returns subsequent to a shock are seen as evidence 
that investors believe that premium increases will be sufficient to make up for 
capital losses resulting from the disaster for the industry, while negative abnormal 
returns are seen as evidence that investors think that such damage will not soon be 
repaired. 
                                                 
2 The first of these disasters – an explosion on a drilling platform – occurred however only in 
1988, and there is a marked clustering of catastrophes at the end of this 30-year period. There is ample evidence that the catastrophes in our study can indeed be viewed 
as unexpected shocks not fully anticipated in premium pricing. This is most 
obviously true for the September 11 terrorist attacks. Prior to these attacks, 
terrorism cover was generally not a separate line of insurance. Typically, it was 
not even mentioned in insurance policies and (all-risk physical damage) policies 
would automatically cover losses associated with such events, as the risk was 
perceived to be insignificantly low. Previous terrorist attacks in the United States 
like the first WTC bombing in 1993 or the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 were 
discounted as non-recurring events in a world where attacks on United States life 
and property occurred exclusively outside the United States. In the case of natural 
catastrophes such as Hurricane Andrew or the Northridge earthquake, insurers 
were aware of the potential hazard, but seemed to underestimate both the 
probability and the severity of the events. This is what transpires from a perusal of 
the specialized insurance literature and it is also reflected in the large discrepancy 
between insured losses and premium incomes collected prior to the events. For 
example, it has been reported that insurance companies’ pay-outs related to 
Hurricane Andrew in Florida exceeded by 50 per cent all premiums collected in 
that state for the past 22 years, while insured losses related to the Northridge 
earthquake alone were equal to the entire amount of premiums collected in the 
20
th century for earthquake insurance (Arnold 2002). Many industry observers 
have argued that in general the premiums collected during the 1990s were too low 
to compensate for the large pay-outs related to natural catastrophes during that 
decade, which included typhoons in Japan and winterstorms in Europe. 
Therefore, it appears reasonable to interpret the disasters considered here as 
unexpected shocks, which caused unexpected losses. Below we investigate 
whether or not investors think that such unexpected losses are compensated by 
subsequent changes of parameters in the insurance industry. This question has so 
far been analysed mainly for single catastrophes and for individual stocks. Shelor 
et al. (1992) and Aiuppa et al. (1993), for instance, find that property-liability 
insurer stock values increased after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in California, despite substantial loss payments by insurers, whereas Lamb (1995), 
when investigating the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, finds “a significant 
negative stock price reaction on property-liability insurers with direct premiums 
written in Florida and Lousiana.” 
Cummins and Lewis (2003) study the effects of three events – Hurricane Andrew, 
the Northridge earthquake from 1994, and the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
They likewise find a strong immediate negative impact of insurer stock prices in 
response to these events, which however dies out soon. The present paper is more 
in line with Chen and Siems (2004), who focus on stock price indices (rather  than 
on individual stocks) and who also broaden the data base to include disasters and 
markets outside the United States. While Chen and Siems (2004) consider only 
terrorist and military attacks, we also consider natural disasters and use three 
different estimates of abnormal returns to make sure that our results are not an 
artifact of the procedure which is employed to isolate the effect of an event. 
 
2. The models and the data 
Table 1 lists the disasters included in our study. They are the 20 most costly 
events in terms of insured property and business interruption losses between 1970 
and 2004,
3 as reported by Swiss Re Sigma (2006). The list is headed by Hurricane 
Andrew, which in August 1992 struck South Florida, Louisiana and the Bahamas 
with winds of up to 140 miles an hour, closely followed by the September 11 
terrorist attacks in 2001, and the Northridge earthquake in 1994.
4 It does not 
                                                 
3 As the table only lists property and business interruption losses, excluding life and liability 
insurance losses, the overall insured losses from these catastrophes are of course much higher than 
indicated in the table. For example, estimates of all insured losses from the 11 September terrorist 
attacks are almost USD 40 billion, with claims to insurers totalling US$ 32.5 billion, and with 
payments by the U.S. federal Victim Compensation Fund equal to USD 5 billion (Kunreuther and 
Koo 2005). 
4 The ranking in table 1 does not correspond to catastrophes in terms of victims. The most costly 
disaster in this respect in modern times, the 1970 storm and flood catastrophes in Bangladesh and 
the recent tsunami in the Indian ocean, both with a cost of about 300,000 lives, are not even include Hurricane Katrina, which at the time of this writing had just finished its 
course across the southern US, with damages which will eventually exceed those 
included in the present table by large amounts. 
- table 1 about here - 
 
As regards the areas affected, the United States are the country most often hit by 
the catastrophic events shown in Table 1. They experienced eleven events from 
different categories, including hurricanes, terrorist attacks, earthquakes and 
storms, with four hurricanes occurring in 2004 alone. Japan experienced three 
typhoons and one earthquake. Europe was hit by three winterstorms in 1990 and 
1999 and by storm and floods in 1987 which affected more than one country at a 
time, and an explosion on a drilling platform in 1988. 
For each disaster, and for each country involved, we estimated normal and 
abnormal returns of the respective insurance industries in three different ways. 
First, via the conventional market model (MacKinlay 1997) 
(1)  Rit = ai + bi Rmt + eit , 
where the subscript i identifies the disaster, Rit is the return of an index of the 
local insurance industry in period t, and Rmt is the return of a broad market index 
in that period, and where ai + bi Rmt is the “normal” return to be estimated from 
the data. Data are daily and range from event day t=– 199 to event day t = 0 (the 
event itself occurs on day t=1). Second, via the market-adjusted return model, 
where ai = 0 and bi= 1. This is mainly to avoid the well known problem of 
correlation between the regressor and the disturbance term in (1) induced by non-
synchronous trading (see e.g. Brown and Warner 1985), which renders 
                                                                                                                                      
included in table 1. Similarly, the earthquake in Tangshan in China in 1976, with 250,000 victims, 
or the tropical Cyclone Gorki in 1991, with 140,000 victims, although gigantic catastrophes in 
almost any sense, did not induce heavy insurance losses in absolute dollar terms, and are therefore 
also not included in the table. conventional least squares estimates of bi inconsistent. As we are using indices 
rather than data for individual firms, this potential bias does not seem to be very 
important here, but it is still useful to have alternative measures of abnormal 
returns. We therefore also used the constant expected returns model where we set 
normal returns equal to zero. In addition to providing yet another measure of 
abnormal performance, this also circumvents the problem that large-scale 
disasters may affect the market (which may be expected almost by the definition 
of such events), which would imply that both the market-model based and the 
market-adjusted abnormal returns do not capture all of the effects of an event. 
Following the disaster, we therefore computed daily abnormal returns for the 
respective country insurance sector either as 
(2)  mt i i it it R ˆ ˆ R AR b - a - = , 
where  i ˆ a  and  i ˆ b , respectively, are estimates for  i a  and  i b  from (1) (the market 
model), or as  
(3)  AR*it = Rit – Rmt 
(the market adjusted returns model), or as 
(4)  AR**it = Rit 
(the constant expected returns model). The subscript i (i=1,.., 20) indicates the 
disaster, Rit is the return of the local insurance sector (either United States, Japan 
or Europe) on event day t, and Rmt is the return of the local stock market. Both the 
total market and insurance industry indices were obtained from Thompson 
Financial Datastream.
5 In every case, the estimation window ranges from event 
                                                 
5 The stock market indices are the Datastream Global Equity Indices that are provided by the 
company Thomson Financial Datastream. The total market indices cover all sectors in each 
country (United States and Japan) or region (Europe). Indices for Europe cover mainly the EU (as 
of 1995) plus Switzerland, which include the countries affected by the disasters under study here. 
Thomson Financial Datastream calculates insurance sector indices using a list of companies, day t=-199 to event day t=0 (which is the day before the event day), and the event 
window ranges from the event day t = 1 to day t = 30. The event itself occurs on 
day t=1. [Unsere bisherige Darstellung erschien mir etwas unklar; allerdings ist 
die neue Darstellung u.U. auch unklar; insofern mit der Bitte um Korrektur des 
vorangehenden Absatzes.] 
Using indices for measuring the performance of insurance industry stocks of 
course obscures the differences in the performance of individual stocks, which 
was a main concern in Lamb (1995) or Cummins and Lewis (2003). Lamb (1995) 
for instance – not unexpectedly –in his investigation of Hurricane Andrew finds 
that investors discriminated among insurers based on the existence and magnitude 
of insurance written, and that the stock prices of insurers with premiums written in 
Florida or Louisiana suffered most (eight small companies folded altogether), 
whereas Cummins and Lewis (2003) reveal a “flight to quality”: the stock prices 
of highly ranked insurers are less affected by catastrophes than the stock prices of 
lower rated firms. As the present paper is concerned with the performance of 
markets, not of firms, we disregard such differences among insurers here. 
A potentially more important drawback is that insurance is a world-wide business. 
For example, among the 10 reinsurance companies most affected by the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, with claims in excess of US$ 500 million each, 
seven were not from the US (see Oxford Metrika, 2003, table 1). The two most 
affected were Munich Re from Germany (claims estimate: US$ 1,959 million) and 
Swiss Re from Switzerland (claims estimate US$ 1,777 million). Therefore, 
catastrophes in one country have an impact on the insurance industry also in other 
countries, which likewise is ignored in our analysis below. We will return to this 
point when discussing our results in section  
                                                                                                                                      
where inclusion in the list are based on market value and availability of data. The company 
reviews the list and weights of index constituents for each market/sector quarterly and re-sets it to 
represent the new relative importance of stocks in terms of market value. At the end of 2004, the 
total insurance sector indices reportedly comprised 46 firms in the case of the United States, 69 in 
Europe, and 8 firms in Japan, respectively.   
3. Results 
Table 2 gives the estimates of the respective market models (model (2) as 
described in previous section). It exhibits a considerable variation in regression 
estimates, even for a given market, which may not appear to be compatible with 
the assumption of a constant market model across the whole time period spanned 
by our data (i.e. 1987 to 2004). In the United States, for instance, the estimates for 
the intercept in the market model range from 0.45 (the OLS-estimate for b 
obtained from 200 daily returns prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks) to 0.95 
(the OLS-estimate for b obtained from 200 daily returns prior to the tornadoes 
which hit the U.S. in May 2003). 
- table 2 about here - 
The are various ways in which one can formally test whether the observed 
variation in the estimated coefficients is due to a shift in the true underlying value 
of b. We first did a series of Cusum-tests, which reject the null hypothesis of 
parameter constancy whenever the cumulated sum of successive forecast errors 
deviates too much from what is expected under the null hypothesis, but could not 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the market model are constant 
throughout the 1987-2004 period which is spanned by the events under study. 
This failure is most probably due to the poor power of the Cusum-test in the 
present context, where structural changes are almost orthogonal to the mean 
regressor. It is well known (see Ploberger and Krämer 1990, 1992) that Cusum-
tests have trouble detecting such changes in the regression coefficients. 
We therefore also did various Chow-tests, which simply compare the estimated 
regression coefficients from different subsamples, and reject the null hypothesis 
of parameter constancy when the difference is too large. These tests showed that a 
constant market model for the whole 1987-2004 period can indeed not be assumed. For the subsamples of lengths 230 which were used to both estimate the 
market model and to compute abnormal returns around a particular disaster, the 
assumption of parameter constancy, which is essential for a meaningful 
application of the market model, can however much more easily be maintained – 
attempts to refute this assumption failed no matter which formal statistical test 
was used. Also, the regression estimates for the market model prior to hurricanes 
Ivan, Charley, Jeanne and Frances, which all occurred in 2004, are very close 
together, indicating that there was no structural change in the market model in that 
year. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative excess returns, as computed according to the 
methods described in section 3. For each event day t, the 20 abnormal returns 
were averaged (arithmetic mean) prior to cumulating. The figure shows that, no 
matter which measure of abnormal performance is used, the insurance sector 
suffers on the day of the disaster, confirming the existing literature. However, 
according to the market-model returns and market-adjusted returns, the insurance 
sector soon recovers and is even outperforming the market about one week after 
the disaster, with a small and insignificant negative cumulative return at the end of 
the post event window. This finding is very much in line with Lamb (1995) or 
Cummins and Lee (2003), who observed similar patterns for specific catastrophes. 
- figure 1 about here - 
 
To see how our results differ from existing ones, table 3 compares the daily 
abnormal market-model returns for a particular event – the September 11 terrorist 
attacks – as computed along the lines explained in section 2 above, and as 
computed by Cummins and Lewis (2003) using a different approach. Cummins 
and Lewis (2003) estimate the market model separately for 43 insurance 
companies, and then average the 43 individual abnormal returns for each event day t = 1,..., 31.
6 Despite the differences in approaches, the respective cumulative 
abnormal returns are in considerable agreement (see fourth and fifth column of 
Table 3).  
- table 3 about here - 
Returning to the global picture, figure 1 shows that cumulative unadjusted returns 
are on average negative throughout the post-event window, and significantly so 
(see below). This is mainly due to the fact that the European and Japanese markets 
were in general negative subsequent to most disasters. Also, the post event 
window for the 1987 European flood catastrophe includes the October 87 stock 
market crash, with a decline in the total market index within the post event 
window of 24%. We therefore also computed cumulative abnormal returns 
separately for the United States, Europe and Japan in order to disentangle the 
effects of regional resilience and unrelated exogenous effects. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the cumulative abnormal returns of the European and 
Japanese insurance sectors in isolation. It is seen that the overall decline in the 
unadjusted insurance sector returns is sharper here. But once the parallel large 
downturns in the general market are accounted for, remaining returns are only 
slightly negative or even positive, as they were in figure 1. 
- figures 2 and 3 about here - 
 
The United States are slightly different. As shown in figure 4, both the total 
market and the insurance sector recover somewhat faster and show positive 
returns soon after a disaster. This confirms Chen and Siems (2004), who likewise 
found a superior resilience of US stock markets to unexpected shocks as 
compared to several other major stock markets. For instance, while both the total 
market and the insurance industry declined by about 5% on the day trading 
                                                 
6 The authors also use another index to cover the market – the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) equally weighted market index - as compared to the Thomson Financial 
Datastream total market index used here. resumed in the United States after the September 11 attack (that is, on 17 
September 2001), both registered a 1% (market) and 8% (insurance industry only) 
increase over the whole post event window. After hurricane Andrew, the 
insurance sector declined by 1.1% on day one but increased by 6.8% over the 
whole post event window (while the rest of the market remained flat).  
As is seen in figure 4, the evaluation by investors of both the economy in general 
(which can be recovered from the figure by adding to the market adjusted returns 
the difference between the constant expected returns series and the market model 
series) and the insurance industry in particular do not seem to suffer much from 
the catastrophes considered here. The point however is that in all regions 
considered here, whether US or not, the respective insurance sectors do not 
feature any sizeable abnormal returns quite soon after a disaster. 
- figure 4 about here - 
This conclusion is also born out by a formal test of statistical significance. Table 4 
shows the abnormal returns as computed according to our models, together with 
estimates of the respective standard deviations and the resulting t-values. It 
confirms what we have already seen in figures 1 - 4: There is a statistically 
significant negative abnormal return on event day 1 according to both the market 
and constant expected returns models, while the null hypothesis that there is no 
cumulative abnormal return at the end of the post event window cannot be 
rejected regardless of the model which we use. 
- table 4 about here - 
 
The estimate of the standard deviation of the market-model abnormal returns, 
which enters the denominator of the t-statistic, was obtained by first computing, 
for each event i, and for each estimation window, the empirical variances S
2
i of 
the abnormal returns  mt i i it it R ˆ ˆ R AR b - a - = ( t = -199, .., 0). Under certain 
regularity conditions (see below), this statistic is a consistent estimator of the true variance σ
2
i of the abnormal daily returns around catastrophe number i, where the 
index i runs from i=1 to i=20. Assuming that event day 1 abnormal returns are 
independent across events (which can be justified from the observation that no 
two events occur on the same calender day), the variance of the average abnormal 
return  
(AR1,1 + AR2,1 +... + AR20,1)/20 





2 + ... +σ
2
20)/400 , 
the square root of which is consistently estimated by  
(5)  Si = ((S
2




In principle, this expression must be augmented by a term which accounts for the 
error in estimating the coefficients of the various market models. These terms are 
however rather small for an estimating window of length 200 used here and can 
be neglected. 
The standard deviations of the average market adjusted and constant expected 
returns on day 1 are estimated using the same method, that is, the empirical 
variances of the respective abnormal returns from the estimation window are 
plugged into formula (5). 
If, for each event, post event window abnormal returns are serially uncorrelated 
(which can safely be assumed), the variance of the respective cumulative 
abnormal returns (when cumulation is done over event days t=1,...,t=30) is 30 
times the expression in formula (5), so an estimate of the standard deviation of the 
cumulated returns is obtained by multiplying this expression by 30
1/2. This is how 
the figures for the standard deviations of the cumulative returns in table 4 have 
been obtained. 
This procedure, though standard, is based on the assumption that the true variance 
of the abnormal returns remains constant in the estimation and post event windows around each catastrophe, which is hard to justify (Boehmer et al. 1991). 
There is on the contrary ample reason to suppose that variances increase in the 
aftermath of an event. We have checked this hypothesis for our sample and have 
indeed found a larger empirical variance subsequent to the event in almost all 
cases, confirming Cummins and Lewis (2003). Therefore, table 5 also shows 
alternative estimates of the abnormal returns standard deviations by simply taking 
the empirical standard deviations of the observed post-event returns. These 
estimates are less precise if there is no event-induced increase in the variance, but 
they are more reliable if the variance does indeed increase. As is seen in the table, 
all standard deviations are much larger now. In particular, the day 1 average 
abnormal returns for the market model and the constant expected returns model, 
which were statistically significant before, are no longer significant if more 
realistic estimates of the variance are used. 
- table 5 about here - 
A minor point concerns the overlap in the post event windows of the 2004 
hurricanes. This overlap induces positive correlation among the respective 
cumulative abnormal returns, which in turn implies that the estimated variance of 
the average cumulated returns for all three models is biased downwards (see e.g. 
Kiviet and Krämer, 1992). However, as the t-statistics computed from these 
estimates already do not allow to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic 
abnormal returns, this null hypothesis cannot be rejected with unbiased variance 
estimates a forteriori. 
Some portion of the resilience of the stock prices of local insurance companies to 
local disasters is certainly due to the fact that some claims are paid by non-local 
insurance companies. In a follow-up study, we will therefore consider only 
reinsurance companies, which operate on a global scale, and we will focus on the 
response of the worldwide insurance industry stock prices to disasters no matter where they happen. A preliminary look at the data however indicates that the 
results of the present paper go through here as well. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our empirical findings suggest that large scale disasters do not negatively affect 
the insurance industry as a whole, at least in the eyes of equity market investors: 
Stock prices of insurance companies do on average not suffer subsequent to 
unexpected disasters which were not foreseen when calculating premiums. This 
implies that investors anticipate that the insurance industry as a whole will be able 
to make losses back over the foreseeable future, i.e. that the adverse shocks to 
equity which have resulted from these catastrophes will be compensated by either 
an outward shift of the demand curve or an ability to raise premiums, or both.  References 
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  Event  Country/Region 
       
22,274  23.08.1992  Hurricane Andrew  United States 
20,716 
 
11.09.2001  Terrorist attacks on WTC, 
Pentagon and other 
buildings 
United States 













27.09.199125.01.1990  Typhoon Mireille  
Winterstorm Daria 
Japan Europe 
6,802  25.12.1999  Winterstorm Lothar  Europe 






Storm and floods in Europe 
United States 
Europe 
4,770  25.02.1990  Winterstorm Vivian  Europe 









3.707  06.09.2004  Typhoon Songda  Japan 
3,475  05.06.2001  Tropical storm Allison  United States 
3,403  02.05.2003  Thunderstorms, tornadoes, 
hail 
United States 
3,304  06.07.1988  Explosion on Piper Alpha 
drilling platform 
United Kingdom 
3.169  17.01.1995  Kobe earthquake  Japan 
1 In US$ dollar millions, indexed to 2005. Estimates of insured property and business 
interruption losses. For hurricanes, event dates indicate landfall. Source: Swiss Re (2006).  
Table 2: Least Squares estimates of the market model 






09/11 terrorist attacks  -0.00031  0.45  0.28 
Hurricane Andrew  0.00007  0.78  0.62 
Northridge earthquake  -0.00032  0.87  0.41 
Hurricane Ivan  0.00027  0.77  0.66 
Typhoon Mireille  0.00023  0.94  0.66 
Hurricane Charley  0.00030  0.75  0.64 
Winterstorm Daria  0.00034  1.04  0.76 
Winterstorm Lothar  -0.00090  1.16  0.70 
Hurricane Hugo  0.00065  0.85  0.68 
Hurricane Frances  0.00034  0.78  0.68 
Storms and Floods  -0.00087  0.90  0.45 
Winterstorm Vivian  0.00049  1.06  0.79 
Typhoon Bart  -0.00172  0.86  0.37 
Hurricane Jeanne  0.00026  0.77  0.66 
Hurricane George  -0.00005  0.90  0.79 
Typhoon Songda  0.00032.  1.31  0.53 
Tropical Storm Allison  0.00071  0.49  0.26 
Tornados  0.00008  0.94  0.78 
Piper alpha  -0.00014  0.95  0.76 
Kobe earthquake  -0.00010  1.10  0.58 
 Table 3: Comparison of estimates of cumulative abnormal returns 

















1  -4.74  -2.69  -3.71 
2  -4.64  -3.33  -5.56 
3  -5.6  -4.19  -6.79 
4  -7.66  -3.92  -8.85 
5  -9.56  -4.99  -9.63 
6  -6.91  -2.02  -5.29 
7  -5.4  0.09  -3.13 
8  -4.29  2.78  -1.67 
9  -1.39  4.49  1.83 
10  1.53  5.95  4.15 
11  0.8  4.80  2.49 
12  1.58  5.81  4.34 
13  3.99  8.07  7.34 
14  3.32  7.30  7.16 
15  4.45  6.25  5.19 
16  5.69  4.75  4.22 
17  6.33  6.03  6.61 
18  6.95  7.07  6.10 
19  6.19  7.78  5.10 
20  5.41  7.33  5.13 
21  6.04  8.41  6.16 
22  6.73  8.86  7.45 
23  4.77  8.90  6.60 
24  3.63  7.35  4.17 
25  3.26  5.91  3.02 
26  5.63  7.98  5.88 
27  3.95  7.24  4.91 
28  4.49  7.14  4.53 
29  4.25  6.44  3.38 
30  4.06  6.36  4.09 
31  2.95  5.52  3.64 
a Cummins and Lewis (2003) number event days differently 
 (day t = 0 is the event day in their notation).  
Table 4: Average abnormal returns and standard estimates of 
standard deviations (percent) 




  a) on event day 1 
average abnormal 
return 
-0.51  -0.34  -0.61 
estimated standard 
deviation 
0.16  0.23  0.25 
t-value  -3.19**  -1.48  -2.44* 
  b) cumulated over days 1,…,30 
average abnormal 
return 
-0.37  -0.44  -1.45 
estimated standard 
deviation 
0.88  1.25  1.37 
t-value  0.42  -0.35  1.06 
*: significant at 5% 
**: significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 5: Event-window-based estimates of standard deviations 




event day 1  0.91  0.77  1.73 
cumulated over 
days 1,...,30 
2.79  4.06  6.14     
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